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The need for management of the marine ecosystem using a broad perspective has
been recommended under a variety of names. This paper uses the term Ecosystem
Management, which is seen as a convergence between the ecological idea of an organ-
isational hierarchy and the idea of strategic planning with a planning hierarchy—with
the ecosystem being the strategic planning level. Management planning requires, in
order to establish a quantiﬁable means and ends chain, that the goals at the ecosys-
tem level can be linked to operational levels; ecosystem properties must therefore be
reducible to lower organisational levels. Emergence caused by constraints at both the
component and system levels gives rise to phenomena that can create links between
the ecosystem and operational levels. To create these links, the ecosystem’s functional
elements must be grouped according to their functionality, ignoring any genetic rela-
tion. The population structure is below the ecosystem in terms of the planning level,
and goals for the community’s genetic structure cannot be meaningful deﬁned without
setting strategic goals at the ecosystem level for functional groups.Contents
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In response to the overexploitation of the marine ecosystem and the consequences
of ﬁshing—habitat destruction, incidental mortality of non-target species, evolution-
ary shifts in population demographics, and changes in the function and structure of
ecosystems—there has been a call for marine ecosystem management from a broader
perspective (Pikitch et al., 2004). There are many terms that cover the idea of manag-
ing marine ecosystems from a broader perspective; Garcia et al. (2003) discusses some
of these terms: Fishery Management, Ecosystem Management, Ecosystem Approach,
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management, Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, and In-
tegrated Management. FAO has settled on the term Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries
and deﬁned this term as:
An ecosystem approach to ﬁsheries strives to balance diverse societal
objectives, by taking account of the knowledge and uncertainties about
biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems and their interac-
tions and applying an integrated approach to ﬁsheries within ecologically
meaningful boundaries (FAO Fisheries Department, 2003).
The term “integrated approach” is here employed to indicate a way of taking ecosys-
tem considerations into the more conventional ﬁeld of ﬁshery management (Garcia
et al., 2003). In other words, the current paradigm of ﬁshery management is to main-
tain target populations through various controls. The solution is to develop this man-
agement into an Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management through incremental
improvements (FAO Fisheries Department, 2003).
Even though, as Garcia et al. (2003) notes, the various concepts are all still fuzzy,
and to a great degree overlap in terms of their ideas and objectives, I will use the
phrase “Ecosystem Management” in this article. I use this term because I do not
necessarily adopt the approach of FAO Fisheries Department (2003), especially, as
will be discussed later, not the idea of an Ecosystem Approach as an incremental
extension of current ﬁshery management. With the use of “Ecosystem Management,”
I will mainly depart from The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee
on the Scientiﬁc Basis for Ecosystem Management (Christensen et al., 1996) and argue
that this is a strategic approach to the management of ecosystems.
I do ﬁnd that a central point must be management; that is, the development of
Ecosystem Management is the development of a theory about how to manage human
activitiesinawaythatsecurestheobjectivesfortheecosystem. AtheoryofEcosystem
Management has two sides; on one hand, there is a need to comprehend the ecosys-
tem, while, on the other, there is a need to develop management tools and understand
7the impact of humans on the ecosystem. A theory of Ecosystem Management must,
in order to be complete and not render the two sides separate, build on a common
ground between scientiﬁc concepts. This common ground is between science related
to ecosystems and science related to management. The purpose of this paper is to
discuss ideas from ecology and those from management, and ﬁnd common ground for
an Ecosystem Management. One of the main interfaces between the marine ecosys-
tem and human activities is through ﬁshery. Consequently, one of the main challenges
facing the management of marine ecosystems is to conﬁne ﬁshery to a level that is
sustainable and economically rational. Therefore, the main focus of this paper is the
production of the marine ecosystem.
Ecosystem Management
In the Christensen et al. (1996), ecosystem management is deﬁned as:
Ecosystemmanagementismanagementdrivenbyexplicitgoals, executed
by policies, protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring
and research based on our best understanding of the ecological interac-
tions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem composition, struc-
ture, and function.
...
Ecosystem management must include the following (1) long-term sus-
tainability as fundamental value, (2) Clear, operational goals, (3) Sound
ecological models and understanding, (4) Understanding complexity and
interconnectedness, (5) recognition of the dynamic character of ecosys-
tems, (6) attention to context and scale, (7) acknowledgment of humans
as ecosystem components, and (8) commitment to adaptability and ac-
countability. (Christensen et al., 1996, pp. 668–669)
There are in the quotes above and through the article (Christensen et al., 1996) a very
comprehensive discussion on ecosystems. They have, however, very little discussion
on management, besides setting objectives and goals.
As the idea of this paper is that Ecosystem Management is about both ecosystems
and management, there is a need to structure the concept of management. Manage-
ment can be broken down into subdisiplines in a variety of ways; I will simply divide
management into three phases, according to its primary time period of focus:
1. Management activities related to the past are called “Monitoring and Evalua-
tion” activities.
82. Management activities related to the near present are called “Operation” activi-
ties.
3. Management activities that deal with future operations are called “Planning”
activities.
Some scholars, for example Mintzberg (1994), distinguish between a plan and a strat-
egy. I will not use this difference, instead referring to all that has to do with the
operation’s preparation at the right time as Planning.
In the Christensen et al. (1996) above cited deﬁnition of Ecosystem Management,
the word “policies“ is used; as “policies” can indicate a mixture of Planning and Op-
eration, the deﬁnition is not perfectly divisible according to the three categories delin-
eated above. If, nevertheless, the deﬁnition of Christensen et al. (1996) is categorised
according to the above division in time periods, then “executed by policies, protocols,
and practices” is equivalent to Operation, and “made adaptable by monitoring and re-
search ...” is equivalent to Monitoring and Evaluation. Planning, then, contains the
following three components:
1. setting the “explicit goals,” and
2. ensuring that the operation will satisfy the “goals.”
The ﬁrst and second components together form the plan. A plan has to be revised after
periods of operation, therefore
3. the plan must be adjusted or adapted to new knowledge based on Monitoring
and Evaluation.
The deﬁnition of management given in Christensen et al. (1996) can then be di-
vided into the three phases of management: Planning, Operation, and Monitoring and
Evaluation. It is nevertheless clear that the point of how to secure that eventual Oper-
ations will accomplish the deﬁned goals and objectives is rather weak in Christensen
et al. From a management perspective, this will be central if Ecosystem Management
is to be be successful.
Also from a management perspective, a plan will be successful if the operation
prescribed in the plan, when executed in the real world, ensures the goals and objec-
tives set out for management. To ensure a plan’s success, there is a need for models
that predict outcomes for various operational options. It is therefore in the planning
stage of management that common ground between ecology and economy must be
9found, at least initially. This paper will therefore focus on the Planning stage of man-
agement, especially the search for concepts that are usable as objects for goals and
planning models.
I note, however, that it is important to discuss all three phases of management.
A management plan cannot be completed without an analysis of potential operational
options, as well as an analysis of possibilities for monitoring Ecosystem Management.
These aspects will nevertheless be left for future work.
Central to ﬁnding common ground between ecology and management is the dis-
cussion of ecological and planning concepts. This is the content elaborated in the
following section 2. The concept of an ecosystem builds on the idea of an organisa-
tion hierarchy, and many papers (e.g., Christensen et al., 1996; Garcia et al., 2003;
Pikitch et al., 2004) on Ecosystem Management agree that it is driven by explicit ob-
jectives and goals. In accordance with this idea, this paper’s thesis is that Ecosystem
Management is a management theory about how to manage human activities and their
impact on ecosystems, where the management is based on strategic planning.
Ecosystem Management is then a convergence of the idea of an organisational
hierarchy with the idea of a planning hierarchy where the ecosystem is the strategic
planning level. In order to bridge goals at the strategic level and plans at the opera-
tional level, there is a need to quantify links between the ecosystem and the operational
level. The ecosystem is a complex adaptive system, and a global restricted resource
will create structure and order in the form of a predictable allocation pattern for re-
sources. Section 3 discusses how a global restriction and associated scarcity create
order and predictability, thereby allowing for the possible link between ecosystem and
operating level.
In section 4, the previous section is summarised and discussed. The result is that
if the focus is on global restriction and associated scarcity, the functionality of an
ecosystem can be expected to be predictable, which provides the simplicity necessary
for seting strategic goals. In the ecological analysis, this follows in the line of, among
others, the trophic–dynamic view of Lindeman (1942) and the process–functional ap-
proaches of O’Neill et al. (1986). The contribution of this paper is to identify this
relation as fundamental to creating the link between the strategic and operational lev-
els when Ecosystem Management establishes a quantiﬁable means–ends chain.
102 Ecology and Management
2.1 Ecology
Ecology was deﬁned by Haeckel in 1879: “By ecology we mean the body of knowl-
edge concerning the economy of nature—the investigation of the total relations of ani-
mal both to its inorganic and its organic environment ...” (Hackel 1879 cited in Keller
and Golley, 2000). The concept of an ecosystem came much later, ﬁrst introduced by
Tansley in 1935. An ecosystem, when used in a speciﬁc context, is often followed by
its deﬁnition (e.g., Christensen et al., 1996; Garcia et al., 2003). As the concept of an
ecosystem needs deﬁnition, it cannot be seen as a concept with a generally accepted
meaning within ecology. To understand why the concept of an ecosystem, after more
than 70years, is not a generally agreed upon concept, a brief introduction to some
philosophical ecology follows in the section bellow. There is, in ecology, a general ac-
ceptance of nature as an organisational hierarchy. However, controversies are related
to the entities and their connections within the hierarchy. Further, there is a debate as
to holism vs. reductionism as the ﬁeld’s proper scientiﬁc approach, these two discus-
sion are to some extent interrelated. This section is philosophically rather incomplete;
for further detail, see, for example, Hull (1974), Looijen (1999), and Keller and Golley
(2000).
Reductionism and Holism
Nature is organised into a hierarchical structure, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. At the
left of the ﬁgure is a depiction of how the lower level of the hierarchy provides the
building blocks for the next, more complex level. Interactions of components on one
level are the origin of phenomena observed at the next level. As phenomena at a given
organisational level result from lower levels, scientiﬁc explanations must look to lower
levels to explain any phenomenon occuring at a given level; this is physical reduction
(Hull, 1974).
At the right of the ﬁgure 1 is a depiction of the hierarchy of scientiﬁc disciplines,
with various disciplines within physics as the most fundamental. As the explanation of
a phenomena must contain an examination of lower levels, scientiﬁc theories can, in
principle, be reduced to more fundamental theories; this is theoretical reduction (Hull,
1974). The idea of physical and theoretical reduction as the proper scientiﬁc approach
is called reductionism.
Nature is, as Looijen (1999) notes, more complicated than the perfect nested hier-
archy in ﬁgure 1. There are, for example, many organisms that are not built from the






populations evolutionary biology, sociology
↑ ↓








organelles cell biology, genetics
↑ ↓
macro-molecules (bio)chemistry, molecular biology
↑ ↓
molecules organic chemistry, thermodynamics
↑ ↓
atoms classicle particle mechanics
↑ ↓
sub-atomic particles physical chemistry
↑ ↓
quantum particles quantum mechanics
Figure1: Classichierarchyoflevelsoforganisationinnature, andassociatedhierarchy
of scientiﬁc disciplines (Looijen, 1999, Figure 1).
12blocks of organs, tissues, cells, and organelles. The idea of an organisational hierar-
chy in Nature is, nevertheless, an ecological paradigm in my opinion. There is general
acceptance of a hierarchy with different levels of organisation. There is not, however,
a general acceptance of reductionism.
Holism, in contrast to reductionism, ﬁnds that some phenomena cannot be ex-
plained by the parts. That is, they are emergent. Pressure and temperature are ex-
amples of emergent properties. Pressure and temperature are gaseous properties that
do not exist at a molecular level, but rather as a result of the internal movements of
molecules. So, an emergent phenomenon is novel; that is, it is not just a statistical
property of its components.
This is, however, not a contradiction of reductionism’s approach. The difference
is the causal links: are there phenomena that can only be explained on the macro
level? The origin of this dispute can be exempliﬁed by Clements (1916)’s view of
plant communities. A plant community is formed by plants invading a disturbed or
abandoned area. The plants are replaced in a patten labelled succession, whereby
the plant community is developed towards an endpoint speciﬁc to that climate: the
Climax. In the view of Clements (1916), it is the community that, given a speciﬁc
environment, causes plants to form the climax. The plant community is viewed as a
superorganism, in the sense that it is an entity with a self-regulating essence.
The opposing view, that of Gleason (1939), found that a community must be seen
as a random assemblage of individuals, or in the view of Lambers et al. (1998, p. 3):
The species composition of a vegetation in a given place is determined by three pro-
cesses:
1. A historical ﬁlter: does the species arrive?
2. A physiological ﬁlter: can the plant germinate, survive, and reproduce? and
3. A biotic ﬁlter: does the species successfully compete and defend for itself?
The ﬁlters are not constant, but rather change over time as a result of change in biota
and environment. While the superorganism approach to communities may have been
abandoned, the concept of the Clementsian superorganism still exists alongside other
staging. The Gaia hypothesis is, for example, basically the superorganism approach
applied to the entire biosphere (Keller and Golley, 2000).
Looijen (1999, p. 233) argues that holism and reductionism can only be seen as
mutually exclusive if holism claims that wholes cannot be analysed and reduction-
ism claims that there are no wholes. Science needs both of these viewpoints. The
holistic approach locates phenomena at high organisational levels, while reductionism
13explains these phenomena. However, irrespective of one’s views on holism and reduc-
tionism, there is common agreement on the paradigm of organisational hierarchy in
Nature.
Dual hierarchy
Tansley (1935) introduced the concept of an ecosystem as “... the whole system (in
the sense of physics), including not only the organism–complex, but also the whole
complex of physical factors forming what we call the environment of the biome ...
(idem p. 299).” Tansley emphasizes how the ecosystem is a psychical system and
a mental construction. Ecosystems can exist at any scale, and smaller systems are
nested within bigger ones, which then serve as the environment for the ecosystem of
interest(idem). Lindeman(1942)advancedthisecosystemconceptwithinthetrophic–
dynamic view.1 Lindeman’s analytic focus is on energy ﬂow as a consequence of
organisms’ feeding, and the emphasis on the dynamic aspects of an ecosystem as a
result of energy ﬂow. The components of an ecosystem are grouped according to
their function. One example is the discrimination between living organisms as parts
of the ’biotic community’ and dead organisms and inorganic nutrients as parts of the
’environment,’ which are found to be arbitrary and unnatural (Lindeman, 1942, p.
168).
While Tansley emphasises how an ecosystem is a mental construction, the Odum
brothers have emphasised the ecosystem as an entity which possesses various kinds of
self-regulating mechanisms, such as a cybernetic network (Patten and Odum, 1981).
This view has, according to some (e.g., Simberloff, 1980), taken over the superorgan-
ism approach and applied it to ecosystems. Simberloff (1980) labels this approach
“essentialism” as it seems to build on the myth of balance-in-nature. Simberloff advo-
cates for liberating the ecosystem concept from high-level determinism and ideas of
ideal states.
The traditional hierarchy in an ecological organism–population–community–bio-
me is, since Tansley (1935) and Lindeman (1942), enriched by ecosystem and func-
tional components; these entities do not ﬁt nicely into an organisational hierarchy,
and they are often simply added as in the left side of the ﬁgure 2, neglecting Lin-
deman’s point that functional components are something different from populations.
How the entities are arranged in the hierarchy is important in the reductionist view
as explanations must come from levels below; this is especially true of the approach
Dawkins (1988) called hierarchical reductionism: “To explain a complex entity at any
1 The meaning of trophic is “pertaining or connected with nutrition and feeding”
14Figure 2: The dual hierarchical structure of ecological systems. To the left is shown
the typical levels of organizations .... To the right the population–community and
process–functional approaches are considered as separate hierarchies (O’Neill et al.,
1986, Figure 9.1)
particular level of organisation, in terms of entities only one level down.” The outline
to the left of the ﬁgure 2 implies that ecosystem processes should be explained by
inter–community dynamics.
In order to elaborate the concept of organisational hierarchicies a new approach
with more hierarchies was introduced by MacMahon et al. (1978) and O’Neill et al.
(1986). Here, the ecological entity is arranged in two nested hierarchies to the right
in ﬁgure 2. In this way, O’Neill et al. divides nature’s organisation into an explicit
population–community hierarchy and process–functional hierarchy. The two hierar-
chies are two perspectives for observing Nature. They are interlinked, as population–
community determines the functionality of the functional components (the biological
part), and the process–functional restricts the population–community (idem).
15Discussion
Ecology traditionally deals with three levels; The individual organism, the population,
and the community (Begon et al., 1996). One can think of this as part of an organ-
isation hierarchy; the ecosystem can then be seen as a community with a physical
environment (Begon et al., 1996, p. 679). Alternatively, it can be seen as a physical
system with processes created by functional components. These two views correspond
to two different views of Nature’s organisational hierarchy, as shown in ﬁgure 2. Of-
ten, this difference in views on organisational hierarchy is confused with the contro-
versy regarding reductionism and holism. For example, label both Looijen (1999) and
Keller and Golley (2000) ecosystems research programs with the process–functional
approach as “holistic”. This label is, as I see it, given for one of two reasons: Either
because researchers do not follow the population–community–ecosystem hierarchical
approach, or because researchers adopt a superorganism approach to the ecosystem.
These two reasons are clearly not the same and ought to be distinguished. I ﬁnd,
consistsent with Simberloff (1980), that there are good reasons to question the com-
munity as well as the ecosystem as entities with self regulation properties, if these
properties cannot be shown to exist on the premises of physical reduction. In addition,
there are, as argued by O’Neill et al. (1986), reasons to distinguish between a com-
munity and an ecosystem in terms of mental constructions: When research aimed at
population–communities, its questions relate to the genetic structure of the system; but
when research is aimed at the ecosystem, its questions relate to ecosystem processes
(i.e., ﬂows of energy and nutrition). In the former case, the basic entity must be the
vehicle for the genes, the organism; in the latter the basic entity must be Lindeman’s
functional components. If research in the process–functional tradition does not apply
a superorganism approach to ecosystems, instead following the lines of reductionism,
I ﬁnd no reason to label it holistic. That is, if holistic means following the ideas of
holism.
2.2 Planning
There are many different approaches to and meanings of planning and how it should
be accomplished. I use a typology of three planning types in this article. Plans can-
not be neatly divided into these three types, as if each type were discrete; rather, all
plans contain some of each planning-type. The types are, nevertheless, important as a
reference and an ideal.
The three planning types are: “Successive Limited Comparisons,” “Rational Com-
prehensive,” and “Strategic”. The ﬁrst two refer to Lindblom (1959), and their key
16Box 1: Replication of Lindblom (1959) two planing ideals.
Rational Comprehensive Successive Limited Comparisons
1a. Clariﬁcation of values or objectives
distinct from and usually prerequi-
site to empirical analysis of alternative
policies.
1b. Selection of value goals and empiri-
cal analysis of the needed action are
not distinct from one an other but are
closely intertwined.
2a. Policy-formulation is therefore ap-
proached through means–end analy-
sis: Firsttheendsareisolated, thenthe
means to achieve them are sought.
2b. Since means and ends are not distinct,
means–end analysis is often inappro-
priate or limited.
3a. The test of a “good” policy is that it
can be shown to be the most appropri-
ate means to desired ends.
3b. The test of a “good” policy is typically
that various analysts ﬁnd themselves
directly agreeing on a policy (without
their agreeing that it is the most appro-
priate means to an agreed objective).
4a. Analysis is comprehensive; every im-
portant relevant factor is taken into ac-
count.
4b. Analysis is drastically limited:
i) Important possible outcomes
are neglected.
ii) Important alternative potential
polices are neglected.
iii) Important affected values are
neglected.
5a. Theory is often heavily relied upon 5b. A succession of comparisons greatly
reduces or eliminates reliance on the-
ory.
17points are replicated in box 1. Lindblom describes the planning ideal as the Rational
Comprehensive. He ﬁnds, however, the comprehensive analysis in 4a. to be impossi-
ble for complex problems. He therefore rejects the Rational Comprehensive planning
method. Instead, Lindblom states that Successive Limited Comparisons seems, for
administrators and other policy analysts, to be the principal method for policy for-
mulation with complex problems. Such administrators and policy analysts pretend
to make plans according to the Rational Comprehensive method but, in reality, their
plans are made using Successive Limited Comparison. Lindblom’s point is: Instead
of focusing on planning ideal that is impossible to accomplish in practice, planning
researchers ought to more closely examine how plans are made in reality; that is, by
Successive Limited Comparison—or, as Lindblom coined it, by the Art of Modelling
Through.
Lindblom (1959) provides only these two types of planning. For complex prob-
lems, he is probably right to reject the comprehensive analysis in 4a. This is, how-
ever, a straw man that Lindblom (1959) built to reject, thereby leaving his “Modelling
Through” method as the only alternative. It is a straw man in the sense that the real
alternative is the strategic approach to planning.
The strategic approach
The general idea behind strategic planning is that planning must depart from clarify-
ing the objectives and values of a plan’s object. Planning must be preformed within a
planning hierarchy, where the strategic level is at the top. At the strategic level, plan-
ning is performed on a large scale with a long time horizon, and strategic goals are
set as the means of achieving the plan’s objectives. With the strategic goals deﬁned,
a tactical plan can be implemented at lower spatial and temporal scales as a means
of reaching the strategic goals. With a tactical plan as a guide, a plan for directing
the actual operation can be set in sufﬁciently high resolution, though shorter in time
(Helles et al., 2000).
Strategic planning differs from Rational Comprehensive planning in that Strategic
planning does not require models that, based on the interaction of elements, can make
predictions on the operational level over long time horizons. Rather, a detailed model
is needed for the near future; for planning further into the future, models must operate
with elements on a larger scale. Another difference is the way in which uncertainty
is handled. In the short perspective, where details are rather well known, uncertainty
can be handled by rules of rational choice. For example, one can maximise the ex-
pected value. On a larger scale, especially on a strategic level, there will be properties
that are so uncertain that they are in practice unknown. Here, the strategic approach
18will be to place the organisation in a good position whatever the outcome of the un-
certainty. This can, for example, be accomplished by allowing for different options
under future plans, where choices depend on future knowledge. The idea that ﬂexibil-
ity is better than a ﬁxed plan based on traditional expected values, was noted by Hart
(1942); for practical examples regarding management of tropical forests, see Albers
et al. (1996). For examples of management related to Christmas-tree production and
related contamination risks to forest watersheds, see Abildtrup and Strange (1999).
As strategic planning entails a hierarchical planning structure, and long-term goals
must dominate more detailed and short term tactical and operational plans, this ap-
proach can be labelled holistic planning. This does not mean, however, that the sci-
entiﬁc approach behind the plan cannot be theoretical and physical reductionism. It
follows that the scientiﬁc concepts underlying the plan must be of different scales; for
example, the plan’s various levels may occur at different levels of the scientiﬁc or-
ganisational hierarchy. To provide a concrete example: The management of a ﬁshery
is, at an operational level, implemented by ﬁshing vessels. Individual organisms are
handled at the aggregate level no higher than a schoal. At higher levels, plans may re-
late to populations or subpopulations, while the strategic plan level must deal with the
marine ecosystem as a whole. Below, I argue that Ecosystem Management combines
the idea of a planning hierarchy with the idea of an organisational hierarchy of Nature.
To summarise and place strategic planning on the same plane as Lindblom (1959),
I provide an outline of strategic planning below.
1c. Clariﬁcation of values and objectives is a prerequisite for an analysing potential
operations.
2c. The plan secures its objective through a means–ends analysis: First the ends are
isolated, then the means to achieving them are sought.
3c. i) The test of a “good” plan is that it shows how a prescribed operation will
provide the means for achieving overall objectives.
ii) A plan is successfully, when the operation prescribed in the plan, when
executed in the real world, ensure the overall objectives.
4c. The plan’s synthesis is achieved through a hierarchical planning approach.
Goals are set at a large tempo–spatial scale for the system as an entire unit.
The plan is developed through means–ends chains toward ﬁner and ﬁner resolu-
tions. Plans are only made in detail for relatively short time horizons, whereas
larger time horizons require plans at more aggregated levels.
5c. Theory is heavily relied upon to qualify and quantify the means–ends chains.
As means and ends are often set at different tempo–spatial scales, theory must
19reﬂect this. For example, a theory may link various levels in an organisation
hierarchy, corresponding to the aggregation levels in the plan.
As noted above, strategic planning can be labelled holistic planning, while a more
reductionist planning approach corresponds to Lindblom (1959) Rational Comprehen-
sive model. This holistic–reductionist dichotomy within planning does not correspond
to holism and reductionism in the scientiﬁc worldview. Nevertheless, the two mean-
ings seem to be confused. When I use the term holistic within planning and manage-
ment, I refer to planning and management only, not to the scientiﬁc view, and I use the
term strategic management to refer to management with a holistic planning approach.
2.3 Ecosystem Management as Strategic planning
In The Emergence of Ecology as a New Integrative Discipline, under the subheading
Ecology must combine holism with reductionism if applications are to beneﬁt society,
(Odum, 1977) writes:
It is self-evident that science should not only be reductionist in the sense
of seeking to understand phenomena by detailed study of smaller and
smaller components, but also synthetic and holistic in the sense of seek-
ing to understand large components as functional wholes. (Odum, 1977,
p. 1289).
The need to raise thinking and action to the ecosystem level is especially
evident as the practices of technology assessment and environmental im-
pact analysis assume increasingly important roles in decision-making ...
(Odum, 1977, p. 1291).
If hierarchical2 theory is indeed applicable, then the way to deal with
large-scalecomplexityistosearchforoverridingsimplicity(Odum,1977,
p. 1292).
The holism that Odum advocates—synthesis on a large scale and a search for overrid-
ing simplicity within large-scale complexity—is a response to the need for decision-
making analysis at the ecosystem level. It is holistic planning that Odum argues for,
not scientiﬁc holism. Hierarchical theory and the search for large-scale simplicity is
exactly what strategic planning requires.
In the quotation from Christensen et al. (1996) given in section 1, the term “clear,
operational goals” is mentioned. The use of the word operational must not be confused
2Odum (1977) use the spelling hierarchal
20with goals at the operational level. Under the elaboration of the second point, it is
written:
... Goals must be explicitly stated in terms of speciﬁc “desired future
trajectories” and “desired future behaviours” of the ecosystem component
andprocessesforsustainability. Furthermore, thesegoalsshouldbestated
in terms that can be measured and monitored. (Christensen et al., 1996,
p. 669)
These are long-term goals set at the ecosystem level. From these goals, the plan must
be developed based on “sound ecological models and understanding.” Again, this is a
holistic planning approach, consistent with strategic planning. The paper is, however,
relatively vague on planning aspects aside from sound ecological models. Under the
elaboration of the third point “sound ecological models and understanding,” Chris-
tensen et al. emphasises that ecological models cannot only be at the ecosystem level,
but must include lower levels of the organisational hierarchy. The meaning of “op-
erational goals” must therefore be that goals are related within an ecological model
and understanding, such that they can be quantiﬁed, measured, monitored, and linked
to the operational level. The Ecosystem Management of Christensen et al. (1996) is
therefore clearly holistic in its managing approach, building on the concept of an or-
ganisational hierarchy in nature. It is vague, however, in recognising the need for a
hierarchical planning.
FAO has, in their Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries: The ecosystem
approach to ﬁsheries (FAO Fisheries Department, 2003), delineated how an ecosystem
approach can be made operational. The outline of FAO’s approach can be seen in box
2. The general idea is from high level ecosystem goals to establish a chain of ends and
means all the way down to the operational level. There is, however, no requirement
that high level goals to be operational goals, as is required by Christensen et al. (1996).
On the contrary; it is clearly stated that “ecosystem health, integrity, resilience, energy
ﬂows and the like are relatively abstract concepts that are not fully understood.” When
concepts are so imponderable, the mean to achieving such goals as: “conserving bio-
diversity, maintaining ﬁshery habitats, protecting important food chain functioning,
and so on” will be very difﬁcult to quantify. Even though biodiversity may be mea-
surable, it is impossible to answer the question: “How much biodiversity is needed
to ensure ecosystem health?” The concepts at the ecosystem level mentioned by FAO
Fisheries Department are, in their own view, either too abstract for measurement or
are of a non-reducible character. There is therefore no way to link strategic goals to
the operational level, and the ends and means chain that links high level goals to the
operational level are then only conceptually identiﬁable. There is no way of knowing
21Box 2: Replication of FAO Fisheries Department (2003, Box 1)
Making EAF operational
Available international agreements and instru-
ments along with work already undertaken at
the national level in some countries reﬂect
a wide consensus on the need for the incor-
poration of an ecosystem approach to ﬁsh-
eries (EAF). However, to make EAF oper-
ational, the principles underpinning this ap-
proach need to be “translated” ﬁrst into pol-
icy goals and then into operational objectives
that can be achieved by applying management
measures. Without this translation, EAF will
remain an important, but largely unachievable,
concept.
From principles to policy goals. The princi-
ples underpinning EAF cover the full spec-
trum of economic, social and ecological con-
siderations of sustainable development. Many
of the “characteristics” of ecosystems, such
as ecosystem health, integrity, resilience, en-
ergy ﬂows and the like are relatively abstract
concepts that are not fully understood. How-
ever, even with our current state of knowledge,
higher–level policy goals can be set, such as
conserving biodiversity, maintaining ﬁshery
habitats, protecting important food chain func-
tioning and so on.
From policy goals to implementation. These
higher–level policy goals then need to be
broken down into more speciﬁc issues, each
with its own operational objective that can be
achieved by applying a management measure.
These need to be at a practical operational
level for stocks, habitat, by–catch, protected
species, income and social aspirations of the
ﬁshers, for example. The chart below shows
the step–wise process to be adopted to facil-











Broad objective for the ﬁshery
High level policy goals
Priority issues
Operational objectives
Indicators & performance measures
evaluation
Monitoring review and performance
(level at which management can address)
(Economic, social, environment)
Indicators and performance measures for each
operational objective provide a framework for
monitoring, review and evaluation of the per-
formance of management in achieving both
the operational objective, and because of the
linkages, the higher–level policy goals.
22how much or how little is required at the operational level. In other words, there is no
model that can verify that a certain action at the operational level will secure higher
level goals and overall objectives.
The consequence of not having a quantiﬁable chain of means and ends is that the
goals set for the operational plan will be ﬂoppy. The operational level is then left with
only incremental planning, what Lindblom (1959) calls Successive Limited Compar-
isons. This consequence is illustrated by the Ecosystem Approach being described as
an incremental extension of current ﬁshery management (FAO Fisheries Department,
2003). A strategic approach, on the other hand, insists on identifying long-term goals
for the management system; for example, this may take the form of a long-term sce-
nario where the management system in interaction with the ecosystem delivers goods
and services on a sustainable basis. From this scenario, one can develop a plan for
changing a current ﬁshery management regime into the long-term goal for the man-
agement system.
There is a general agreement that Ecosystem Management is essentially strate-
gic management. FAO Fisheries Department (2003) do not appreciate, however, the
need for the quantiﬁable links between planning levels, as required by strategic plan-
ning. FAO’s approach looks like a strategic planning approach, but seems to result in
only Successive Limited Comparisons. In order to ensure that management meets its
overall objectives, there is a need to identify ecosystem properties that can be quantiﬁ-
ably linked to the operational level; that is, ecosystem properties that can be explained
through lower level elements’ interactions. There is, in other words, a need for making
a holistic plan quantiﬁable to the operational level, and a need for high-level phenom-
ena that can be explained through physical reduction.
3 Emergence
As argued in the previous section, Ecosystem Management can be seen as a man-
agement theory that insists on a strategic approach to management. The strategic
approach brings with it the search for overriding simplicity at the ecosystem level and,
at the same time, the ability to link this overriding simplicity to the operational level.
In this section, I present a view of how overriding simplicity at the system level can be
found. It is not my intention to point to new ecological methods—many ecologists are
aware of the principle that I put forward. Rather, my intention is to explain why these
speciﬁc principles provide concepts and models that can create linkages between the
strategic and operation levels, and can therefore create concepts applicable to Strategic
planning.
23This view combines methods and theories from many disciplines, each with its
own tradition and discourse. The general theme is organisational hierarchy within a
two-level hierarchy: individual elements at the lower level and a system consisting
of the set of elements in union, referred to as the system- or macro-level. This type
of analysis is practiced in physics, economics, and ecology, and my intention is to
combine traditions from these ﬁelds into a general understanding of predictions at
an ecosystem level. Central to organisational theoretical discourse is the concept of
emergence. Traditionally emergence can be deﬁned as follows:
A system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the
macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts
at the micro-level. Such emergents are novel w.r.t. the individual parts of
the system (Wolf and Holvoet, 2005).
This deﬁnition insists on the novelty of a property for it to be labelled Emergent. This
is, in my view, too narrow, especially as a holistic plan needs properties that can create
linkages between two levels. In the present paper, I shall point to emergent properties
that might not be recognised as an emergence because they are basically the sum of
their individual parts. Therefore, the properties may be self-evident to exits on the
system level. However, I ﬁnd this special type of emergent phenomena very important
to planning.
In recognising different types of emergence, I am inspired by Bar-Yam (2004),
who identiﬁes four different types of emergence:
• Type 0 emergence: The system is the sum of its components
• Type I emergence: weak emergence. The interaction of components gives rise
to properties that can be observed at a macro-level. However, properties at the
macro level are not under a constraint
• Type II emergence: strong emergence. The interaction of components gives rise
to properties, and these properties at the macro-level are under a constraint.
• Type III emergence: Lock and key systems.
It is type II emergence that I ﬁnd important. In physical and production systems, con-
straints at the system level impose order onto the elements. In addition, a system level
constraint creates, in systems with adaptive agents, scarcity that guides the allocation
of resources. Finally, scarcity and allocation guides evolution. These three aspects
will be discussed in the following section.
243.1 Global restriction and emergence
A physical system
The ideal of reductionism is Newton’s work, which reduced Kepler’s law of planetary
movements and the attraction between massive bodies into “classic mechanics.” By
introducing the theory of universal gravity and the mechanic law, Newton was able
to calculate trajectories within a two body problem, such as one planet orbiting the
sun. For a three body system, however, it was impossible to ﬁnd general solutions;
differential equations can be written, but not solved analytically. Poincarè (1890, cited
by Ekeland, 2006), was the ﬁrst to identify the three body problem as a chaotic system.
He found that there were solutions that, while non-increasing, were nevertheless non-
periodic. Furthermore, a three body system is very sensitive to initial conditions; a
small change in the initial condition will yield highly differential trajectories for the
bodies.
At the core of Poincare’s analysis is the “Stationary Action Principal.”3 If a system
consists of, for example, three bodies, each with 10 variables describing their position,
speed, rotation, andaxisdisplacement, themechaniclawsprescribeasetofdifferential
equations. Poincarè introduced, together with the system of differential equations, the
use of global energy conservation. That is, if the 10 variables of body a at time t are
(xa,1(t),xa,2(t),...,xa,10(t)) there is a function describing the energy of the system
H(t) = H (xa,1(t),...,xa,10(t),xb,1(t),...,xb,10(t),xc,1(t),...,xc,10(t))
The mechanic laws are energy conservative: If the initial total energy is h, then the
system conserves this energy level:
H(t) = h (1)
This equation (1) of energy conservation describes, together with the mechanic laws,
a hypersurface in the variable space called an attractor. The curve described by the
variable x(t) is a trajectory, and if the trajectory starts on the attractor it stays on that
attractor.
The analysis of Poincarè combines an analysis of the parts—the bodies—with a
synthesis of the total system—the energy of the system. This approach provides pre-
dictions for attractors and for the bodies’ trajectories; trajectories that are too complex
3The analyse of Poincarè is a “Stationary Action Principal” because it is a development of the meta-
physical “Least Action Principal” (Maupertius 1745, cited by Ekeland, 2006). The minimization principle
had to be abandoned in favour of the stationary principle of energy.
25for analysis by other methods. Even though the conservation of energy follows from
the laws of mechanics, i.e., from the conservation of energy in the interaction of parts,
itisstillactingasatypeIIemergence, wheretheglobalconstraintrestrictsthepossibly
positions of the interaction parts.
Economic systems
Physical systems are often analysed using a global constraint. For example, these may
be constraints imposed by energy or mass conservation. Economic systems are often
analysed in a similarly way, with a global restriction on input such as that imposed by
a budget restriction. Take, for example, a factory with several production units, and
each with its own production function fj based on an external input xj and an internal
input zi,j. The internal input is the production unit’s production internally distributed;
that is, zi,j is the internal distribution from i to j. In other words, z is an input–output
matrix. The outlet from the production unit j is yj = fj(xj,z1,j,z2,j,...) −
P
i zj,i.
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The attractor Ψ is probably some hyperspace that is a subset of the full output space,
with as many dimensions as the production function. The restriction on input to the
system x• creates a type II emergence: the attractor of production Ψ. If we are con-
sidering a factory, the points on the attractor Ψ that are farthest away form the origin
in a given direction is in economics known as the Production Possibility Frontier. In
addition, the internal allocation is, when production occurs on this frontier, said to be
technically efﬁcient. An economic analysis of a production system can then be said to
be an analysis of type II emergence created by a constraint, such as ﬁxed inputs or a
budget constraint.
Ecological systems
Ecosystems are far more complicated than in the simple production model (2) used
above. One fundamental difference is that, in the ecological system, the product and
the production unit are the same: A single ﬁsh is, for example, both a product that can
be eaten by other ﬁsh or humans, and a production unit that by consuming smaller ﬁsh
produces through its somatic growth or through reproduction. To have a meaningful
26model for this process, we must average by grouping production units into suitable






zj,i − yj (3)
xj represents the resource that is restricted to x• at the system level. The elements
zi,j in the input–output matrix represent the quantity individuals in unit j consume
from a unit i per time unit. The element yj represents the human extraction from the
resource, and the production function fj must include the maintenance, respiration,
and reproduction costs of the group’s units.
This model (3) is a production model, as it is built over the physical principle of
conversion of mass. This principle is secured by the input–output matrix z and the
global constraint x• =
P
j xj. As in the physical system and the production model
(2), the global constraint may create an attractor, here the outlet y. As biomass may
accumulate in the form of an increase in sj, it is a possibility in the simple model (3),
that the attractor will not be deﬁned without additional assumptions.
In a biological system, the input–output matrix is itself a function of s: z = z(s).
Whether the model above will be useful depends to a high degree on whether the
input–output matrix function z(s) and the production functions fj are predictable. In
addition, a system of differential equations like the above has a high probability of
exhibiting chaotic behaviour. Whether the functions are predictable, and whether the
attractor will be useful as an ecosystem property, will all depend on the principle for
how the production units are grouped.
3.2 Self-organised systems
Economic systems
If the economic system (2) is a manufacturing factory, a manager can decide how
the input x• will be divided into the vector x, and will also determine the internal
allocation—the input-output matrix z. The manager might use some type of optimi-
sation principle and plan the operation using the Rational Comprehensive principle.
On the other hand, if the system is the supply side of an economy’s private sector,
then the production functions fi are the production functions of economic agents. The
internal allocation, the vector x, and matrix z are determined by the interaction of
these agents. Under the assumption of a market with perfect competition (i.e., full
information about price and quality, everybody being a price taker, ﬁrms selling iden-
tical products, costs of trading low) the allocation of resources will be efﬁcient; that
27is, somewhere on the Production Possibility Frontier. Here the assumption of a perfect
market can make predictions related to internal allocation. In this way, the restriction
on the system level, together with knowledge about the allocation regime, reduce the
production system’s attractor.
If resources are allocated under another regime, for example, an open access
regime, the agents will compete to get resources ﬁrst. The system’s production will
not be at the production frontier, but the allocation will still be structured according
to the allocation regime, with a reduction in the total production’s attractor as a con-
sequence. Knowing the global restriction, the internal production function, and the
allocation regime will produce a relatively small attractor for production.
Ecological systems
Withinasingleorganism, itisexpectedthatwewouldﬁndanallocationofresourcesas
if it were optimised. For example, we would expect to ﬁnd the distribution of nitrogen
in a tree canopy’s leavaes to follow the general rule of maximisation. In this case, the
ﬁrst order condition is that the marginal change in daily photosynthesis with respect
to a marginal change in a leaf’s nitrogen content must be equal over the entire tree.
Lambers et al. (1998, Box 7) shows that the empirical distribution closely follow this
principle. This allocation would not have come into place because of a perfect market;
rather, it is a product of evolution. The evolutionary process has favoured those trees
that utilise their resources best; that is, according to the optimisation principle.
Between organisms, however, it is normal to expect competition for resources,
both between individuals of different species and between individuals of the same
species. At the same time, all individuals will try to avoid being eaten. The general
allocation regime in nature therefore corresponds to what is known as open access in
economics. This is generally true, though with some exceptions, such as with social
animals, parental care, symbiotic lifeforms, and the like.
3.3 Adaptation and evolution
Economic systems
Both economic and ecological systems are not only complex, they are Complex Adap-
tive Systems (Arthur et al., 1997b; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Gell-Mann, 1995; Hol-
land, 1996; Levin, 1998). The complexity comes from many locally interacting com-
ponents, which in economics are called agents, and the adaptivness origin in the
agents’ adaptive responses to local interactions. Some studies of complex systems
28emphasise the system’s unpredictability, as with the Arthur et al. (1997a) stock mar-
ket model, where agents adapt to signals from the marked; this adaptation will cause
unpredictably ﬂuctuations in the stock market. In contrast, the emphasis of this ar-
ticle is on system properties that can be predicted. Economics has long tradition of
this. For example, environmental economists advocate for tradeable pollution permits
(Montgomery, 1972) and tradeable extraction permits (Clark, 1990). Tradeable per-
mits create a market, whereby the most cost efﬁcient actors will be willing to pay
most for permits, thereby creating an efﬁcient allocation of scarce resources. This is
an analysis of how the Complex Adaptive System will adapt to constraints imposed
by a policy. Tradeable pollution and extraction permits are equivalent to a restriction
on the input x• to the model system (2), and an imposement of an free market regime.
The market will, in the short run, allocate quotas to those who use the resource most
efﬁciently, and the production y will be close to the production possibility frontier, if
the market has perfect competition.
Aside from the short-run effects of production approaching the production pos-
sibility frontier, another well known consequence is that technical development will
increase production efﬁciency with respect to the permit’s object. If, for example, the
restricted resource in the model is a ﬁxed level of CO2 quotas that are tradeable be-
tween agents, then the short run consequence is an allocation of quotas to those who
use the resource most efﬁciently. The scarcity created by the quota also sends a signal
for changing production strategies.4 That is, production strategies may shift toward
initiating development with regard to more efﬁcient use of not only the CO2 quota,
but of all diverted products, for example more efﬁcient energy use. In this way, global
restrictions guide development not only for the primary users of the permits’ object,
but also creates a scarcity in the system that works as a guide for future production
development.
The above discussion only considers the consequences of a perfect market regime,
but what happens if the regime is open access? For example, imagine a ﬁshery where
the government, to prevent overﬁshing, has put a total allowable catch on ﬁsheries,
such that there is a yearly ﬁxed catch of x•. When the year’s catch reaches a total of
x•, the ﬁshery is stopped for the rest of the season. The open access regime conveys a
signalthat, becauseitthreatenstoclosetheﬁshery, makestheﬁsherconsidertimetobe
a scare resource. The short term outcome will be a race to catch ﬁsh before the ﬁshery
is stopped—in reality, before the other ﬁsher catches theirs. The scarcity of time sends
a signal at the same time to change production strategies. That is, ﬁrms should initiate
4Strategy is used here for agents’ behavioural rules given all possible circumstances, like in game
theory. Unfortunately, this is also the same word used for the strategic level of a strategic plan.
29development with regard to more efﬁcient usage of time. As the allocation regime
rewards those who catch ﬁsh fastest and most costefﬁciently, an evolution toward more
and more efﬁcient ﬁshery strategies is the result—followed by a shorter and shorter
time lap before closures of the yearly ﬁshery.
As seen above, the scarcity created by global constraints and allocation regimes
jointly guide evolution, irrespective of whether there is a perfect market or open ac-
cess. Other types of allocation regimes will do the same; for example, in a system
where the allocation regime is dominated by nepotism or bribery. This will send sig-
nals to agents who adapt their strategies thereafter. This will have the consequence of
these regimes experiencing their special type of evolution.
Human society is generally a complex adaptive system with a great deal of subsys-
tems, where adaptation works just as in economic systems. For example, Hull (2001)
argues for science to be thought of as an evolutionary process of scientiﬁc concepts,
and Gell-Mann (1995) suggests that human language changes vocabulary over time as
a consequence of adaptive processes. None of these systems, however, posit a produc-
tionsystemstructurewithaglobalrestrictionasthemodel(2). Science(hopefully)has
mechanisms for testing a scientiﬁc concept’s usefulness as a description of the world.
Similarly, language is restricted by its usefulness for communication. They are, even
though they are part of the global production system, not by themselves systems as in
the production system model (2), in which a global restriction leads to scarcity. As a
consequence, the evolution of these ﬁelds are not predictable in the same way. Another
example is art and fashion; there is no doubt that these develop as the consequence of
an adaptive process, but predictions will be difﬁcult as there is no resource that exists
under a global restraint.
For an outside spectator, these phenomena—art, fashion, and language—will con-
stitute type I emergence. Type I emergence in a Complex Adaptive System yields
evolution that is hard to predict. Type II Emergence may, on the other hand, be hard to
recognise as an emergence because it can be simply a restriction on the sum of parts.
Nevertheless, type II emergence has predictable consequences for the system.
Evolution in ecosystems
The economic system is, as an evolutionary system, in a state where productivity re-
lated innovation is quite staggering. Despite the possibility to predict the direction
of the evolution, its pace, and the resulting production structure will be faltering. In
contrast, the biosphere is, in its fundamental parts, quite old; the many metabolic sys-
tems and enzymes are shared with little difference across kingdoms, and organelles’
functionality is shared by eukaryotes. Examples are the Calvin Cycle—the chemical
30pathway for converting water and carbon dioxide into sugar5—and, especially, Ru-
bisco6—which is almost identical throughout the plant kingdom (Stryer, 1995). The
most recent physiological invention within photosynthetic functionality was the evo-
lution of the C4 pathway7 that enhances the Calvin Cycle under low carbon dioxide
concentrations, high temperatures, and water shortages (Lambers et al., 1998). Based
on the molecular clock of DNA mutations, the evolution of the C4 plants seems to
originate 25–32 million years ago, whereas they ﬁrst show up in paleontological ob-
servation 12.5 million years ago (Osborne and Beerling, 2006). Since 6–7 million
years ago signiﬁcant amounts of the C4 plants contributed to primary production in
the tropic. Today they dominate the tropical savannas and grasslands, and account for
approximately 30% of terrestrial carbon ﬁxation (idem).
This evolution of physiological functionality is, from a geoecological perspective,
staggering and of huge consequence—atmospheric CO2 levels decreased, dry savan-
nas with ﬁre regimes emerged, and animals evolved in response to new conditions
(Beerling, 2007). From a human perspective, this is nevertheless so slow that it can
be seen as constant for all practical intents and purposes. In other words, organisms
will all be very close to a local optimum with respect to the internal use of scarce
resources. Optimum as an individual in evolutionary terms; competing for resources,
avoiding predators, and ultimately reproducing successfully, and local means that evo-
lution is an accumulation of selections deriving from small variations in the popula-
tion; evolution is therefore incremental and restricted by its evolutionary history. As
the allocation regime is almost always open access in ecosystems, this does not lead to
efﬁciency on a global scale. It does mean, however, that seemingly identical solutions
turn up across phylogenetic lines. One example is that the C4 pathway, according to
DNA data, developed in over 40 different places in the phylogenetic tree (Osborne and
Beerling, 2006), but where the production is functionally identical.
In addition, the physical environment imposes constraints that are often tackled in
a discrete set of ways. For example, where plants’ buds are situated during seasons
with adverse conditions (e.g., cold seasons, dry seasons) forms the basis for group-
ing plants according to a set of lifeforms (phanerophyte, chamaephytes, geocrypto-
phytes,...)(Raunkiær, 1907). Raunkiær’s lifeforms group plants across the phyloge-
netic tree, and as these plants compete in similar ways for the same resources, they will
become functionally more alike than if they were grouped according to phylogeny.
These similarities in functionality lead to the possibility of grouping organisms
5Triose phosphates
6The principal protein for deoxidiation of carbondioxide
7Example of important C4 food crops are maize, sorghum, millet, and sugarcane.
31across the phylogenetic tree according to how they function in relation to an ecosys-
tem’s production; that is, into the functional components of Lindeman (1942). A
proper grouping of individuals according to functionality, in addition to the matching
input–output matrix z, will be emergent from the scarcity imposed by global con-
straints. Understanding how scarcity and allocation regimes group individuals into
functional groups is a key to creating linkages between the ecosystem level and the
organism, linkages which are needed for strategic plans.
Within ecology, there is a niche theory with a Competitive Exclusive Principle
that states that if two species utilise the same niche of an ecosystem, one will be
better and will eventually out-compete the other (Begon et al., 1996). This theory
expects that all species use the ecosystem in a different manner, which is then clearly
the opposite view of the principle of functional grouping presented above. This is,
however, a matter of scale. It is not expected that individuals within a functional
group will perform exactly identically. On the contrary, it is expected that there will
be great diversity, for example, with respect to physiological adaptation to a climate.
The adaptive process works on the functional group as a whole; a change in climate
will favour those among diverse functional groups that are best adapted for the change,
leading to a short-term selection of the most ﬁt, and a long-term evolution in genetic
material.
3.4 Summary
Constraints working on the system level give rise to type II emergence. In this sec-
tion we ﬁrst show how type II emergence creates attractors in physical and economic
production systems. The ecosystem will, as a physical system, show similar emer-
gences and attractors when restraints work on the system level. We then develop a
simple production model (3) for the ecosystem. As this model contains a restraint on
external inputs, an internal allocation matrix, and production as a function of allocated
resources, it has the properties of a production model. In addition to the attractor
directly created by the constraint, the constraint also creates a scarcity of resources
as seen by the agents in adaptive systems like economic and ecological ones. This
scarcity will, irrespective of a market or open access regime, create knowledge about
internal allocation. At the same time, the scarcity and the allocation regime will guide
evolution. Evolution is therefore directional and predictable when there is scarcity.
In an ecosystem seen as a physical and production system, order and predictability
are expected to be related to production. The elements must be grouped according
to their function in the production system in order to reveal this predictability. That
is, they must be grouped into the functional components of Lindeman (1942), and the
32element–system hierarchy will then correspond to the process–functional hierarchy of
O’Neill et al. (1986).
4 Discussion
Ecosystem Management is a management theory about how to manage human activi-
ties and their impact on ecosystems in ways that secure the ecosystem’s objectives. A
theory of Ecosystem Management, then, has two sides. On one hand, there is a need
to comprehend the ecosystem, while on the other there is a need to develop manage-
ment tools and understand their impact on the ecosystem via humans. Management
activities can be categorised according to time, i.e., whether the activity is related to
the past, present, or future. In this paper, the focus was on activities related to the
future, which we referred to as planning. It is, however, noted that a management plan
cannot be completed without an analysis of potential operational options, as well as
an analysis of possibilities for monitoring in the context of Ecosystem Management.
Nevertheless, as a planning activity particularly calls for common ground between
ecology and management, we focus on planning concepts that can bridge disciplines
in this paper.
The concept of ecosystems is inseparable from the idea of an organisational hi-
erarchy in nature, and strategic planning operates within a planning hierarchy where
long-term plans must dominate more detailed, short-term plans. In the paragraph 2.3,
we ﬁnd that Ecosystem Management is a convergence between the ecological idea of
an organisational hierarchy and the idea of strategic planning—with the ecosystem as
the strategic planning level.
From a management point of view, a plan is successful if the operation prescribed
in the plan, when executed in the real world, ensures management’s goals and objec-
tives. To ensure a plan’s success, there is a need for models that predict the outcome of
operational options. As the strategic goals must be set at the ecosystem level, and op-
erations are preformed lower in the organisational hierarchy, there is a need for models
that can create linkages between the ecosystem level and the operation level.
Models are a simpliﬁed representation of systems and phenomena in the real
world. The process of creating models can be stylized as illustrated in ﬁgure 3:
1. The real world is simpliﬁed into a conceptual model
2. The conceptual model is speciﬁed and formalized into a mathematical model
3. The mathematical model is calibrated, that is, the parameters in the mathemati-
cal model are estimated, and
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Figure 3: Mathematical modelling. (After Pedersen and Pedersen, 2005, ﬁgure A.45)
4. The model is validated, e.g., by testing the calibrated model on data not used for
calibration.
The focus of this paper is on the ﬁrst point: How to pinpoint models’ concepts?
In ecology, there is an agreement that Nature is an organisational hierarchy. Dis-
putes exist within ecology over causality in the hierarchy. These disputes center
around approaches represented by reductionism, which demonstrate a strictly bottom-
up causality, and those of holism, which demonstrate a top-down causality. Type II
emergence(Bar-Yam,2004),whichiscausedbyaconstraintworkingbothonthecom-
ponent and system levels, gives rise to phenomena that create order within the system.
The system level constraint can be imposed merely by summing the constraints on
elements’ interaction, such as the need to conserve mass or energy. Type II emergence
therefore ﬁts into the reductionist view of strictly bottom-up causality, though to some
degree it also ﬁts into the holistic view of order created at the system level.
OrderandpredictabilityastypeIIemergencesarepresentedinthesection3, which
is found in physical and production systems. Emergence is created by a constraint on
a ressource at the system level. An ecosystem will, as a physical system, exhibit this
emergence. The model (3) represents a simple ecosystem production model that, un-
der additional assumptions, may show a similar emergence. The characteristics that
make this model a production model are: a restraint on external inputs, an internal
allocation matrix, and the elements’ production as functions of the allocation. In a
system with adaptive agents, the system level constraint creates a scarcity of resources
as seen by the agents. The allocation regime under which the resources are internal
allocated creates additional order. In addition, the scarcity directs evolution and makes
its direction predictable. In order to proﬁt from the order and predictability that is a
34consequence of type II emergence, the ecosystem’s elements must be grouped accord-
ing to the order evolution has created with respect to production.
Aside from the dispute in ecology with regard to causality in the organisational
hierarchy, therearedifferentviewsastowhattheconceptofanecosystemis, aswellas
how Nature’s organisation hierarchy works. O’Neill et al. (1986) suggested that there
is a dual hierarchy: the population–community and the process–functional hierarchy.
The present analysis of where type II emergence can be found converges with the
dual hierarchy view, and expects order and predictability in the process–functional
hierarchy. The ecosystem is considered here a physical and a production system, and
elementsaregroupedaccordingtotheirfunctionalcomponentsinthetrophic–dynamic
view of Lindeman (1942).
O’Neill et al. (1986) suggests a dual hierarchy where the second hierarchy is the
population–community. Questions related to this hierarchy relate to the context of ge-
netic relations; the phenomena in this hierarchy are therefore not direct consequences
of scarcity, and are therefore not caused by a type II emergence. Phenomena caused by
other types of emergence are not examined in this paper, but probably are the dynamic
and evolution related to this type of emergence hard to predict. The attractor related
to the population–community hierarchy may therefore be very large and not useful for
creating a quantiﬁable ends–means link between the ecosystem and operation levels,
at least not by itself. This does not mean, however, that this view must be ignored.
The attractors for the process–functional system restrict the population–community
system; the population–community system is therefore below the ecosystem in terms
of its planning level. Goals for the community’s genetic structure can therefore not be
meaningfully deﬁned without strategic goals set at the ecosystem level for functional
groups.
Conclusion
Generally, models are simpliﬁcations made to understand the world. The question
of how to identify modelling concepts is fundamental to science and, if science is
an evolution of concepts for describing the world (Hull, 2001), the question becomes
akin to philosophy. Particular planning and management build on models for how
the real world works—not necessarily mathematical models, but always conceptual
models. This paper develops a thesis for how to select concepts for management
models in the context of Ecosystem Management. As the question of how to identify
concepts touches on a philosophic level, the ﬁndings of this paper cannot be seen as
a proposition that can be either proven or falsiﬁed; it must be seen as a thesis that
shows its usefulness by applying it as a method for practical planning and modelling
35problems.
In summary, the thesis of this paper is that Ecosystem Management is a conver-
gence between the ecological idea of an organisation hierarchy and the idea of strate-
gic planning with a planning hierarchy—with the ecosystem as the strategic planning
level. Management planning requires, in order to establish a quantiﬁable means and
ends chain, that the ecosystem level’s goals can be linked to operational levels; ecosys-
tem properties must therefore be reducible to lower organisational levels. Emergence
caused by a constraint that works both on the component and system levels gives rise
to phenomena that can create links between the ecosystem and operation levels. To
create these links, the ecosystem’s functional elements must be grouped according to
their functionality, ignoring their genetic relation. The population structure is below
the ecosystem in terms of planning level, and goals for the community’s genetic struc-
ture cannot be meaningfully deﬁned without strategic goals set at the ecosystem level
for functional groups.
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